СОВРЕМЕННАЯ ЖУРНАЛИСТИКА: ТЕМАТИКА И ПРОБЛЕМАТИКА

Гювен Ахмет, доцент, кафедра новых медиа и коммуникаций, факультет коммуникаций, Университет Бандырма Оньеди Эйлюль, г. Бандырма, Турция; e-mail: aguven@bandirma.edu.tr, ORCID 0000-0002-2452-2992

Йылмаз Зафер, аспирант, кафедра международных отношений, факультет экономики и административных наук, Университет Бандырма Оньеди Эйлюль, г. Бандырма, Турция; e-mail: zaferyilmaz@ogr.bandirma.edu.tr, ORCID 0000-0003-3253-9898

Токтай Якуп, доцент, кафедра новых медиа и коммуникаций, факультет коммуникаций, Университет Бандырма Оньеди Эйлюль, г. Бандырма, Турция; e-mail: ytoktay@bandirma.edu.tr, ORCID 0000-0002-0348-8238

АНАЛИЗ ОТНОШЕНИЙ МЕЖДУ СТРАНАМИ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ТЮРКСКИХ ГОСУДАРСТВ И ИЗРАИЛЕМ НА ОСНОВЕ СОБРАННЫХ В МЕДИА БОЛЬШИХ ДАННЫХ

Целью данного исследования является изучение отношений стран – членов и наблюдателей Организации тюркских государств (ОТГ) с Израилем. Был проанализирован массив больших данных платформы GDELT, на которой проводится мониторинг глобальных СМИ в режиме реального времени. Изменения внешнеполитической риторики были рассмотрены за два периода – до и после операции «Наводнение Аль-Акса» 7 октября 2023 г. Анализ основан на изучении характера событий и тональности СМИ с использованием шкалы Голдштейна и переменной «Средний тон». В общей сложности были обработаны 81 620 сообщений с помощью приложения Flask на Python для определения метрик «согласованности», «наложения» и «потенциала коллективной конвергенции». Анализ показал, что в докризисный период страны ОТГ транслировалм гармоничный и конструктивный дискурс в отношении Израиля, однако после кризиса заняли более осторожную и сбалансированную позицию.

***Ключевые слова**: Организация тюркских государств, Израиль, большие данные, GDELT, внешняя политика, СМИ.*

Как цитировать: *Гювен А., Йылмаз З., Токтай Я.* Анализ отношений между странами Организации тюркских государств и Израилем на основе собранных в медиа больших данных // Вестник Московского университета. Серия 10. Журналистика. 2026. № 1. С. 36–72. DOI: 10.55959/msu.vestnik.journ.1.2026.3672

Ahmet Güven, Associate Professor, Department of New Media and Communication, Communication Faculty, Bandırma Onyedi Eylül University, Bandırma, Türkiye; e-mail: aguven@bandirma.edu.tr, ORCID 0000-0002-2452-2992

Zafer Yilmaz, PhD Student, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bandırma Onyedi Eylül University, Bandırma, Türkiye; e-mail: zaferyilmaz@ogr.bandirma.edu.tr, ORCID 0000-0003-3253-9898

Yakup Toktay, Assistant Professor, Department of New Media and Communication, Communication Faculty, Bandırma Onyedi Eylül University, Bandırma, Türkiye; e-mail: ytoktay@bandirma.edu.tr, ORCID 0000-0002-0348-8238

ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF TURKIC STATES AND ISRAEL FROM A MEDIA BIG DATA PERSPECTIVE

This study aims to examine the relations of the member and observer countries of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) with Israel, based on Big Data and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). To this end, the study aims to analyze the bilateral diplomatic relations of the OTS countries with Israel and their capacity for collective action. In this context, the study analyzed the GDELT (Global Database of Events, Location, and Tone) Big Data database, which monitors global media and event data in real time. Changes in the foreign policy rhetoric and attitudes of the OTS countries towards Israel were examined in two separate periods: before and after the Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023. This process analysis is based on an examination of the nature of events and media tone in the OTS countries' relations with Israel. A diplomatic interaction map was created to reveal the diplomatic tendencies and collective behavior potential of the OTS countries during the specified periods. This was done using the Goldstein scale, which measures the impact of events in news reports, and the Average Tone variable, which measures the average emotional tone of news reports. A total of 81.620 events were processed using a Python-based Flask application to determine the metrics of 'alignment,' 'overlap,' and 'collective convergence potential.' The analysis revealed that the OTS countries developed a relatively harmonious, constructive, and balanced discourse towards Israel in the pre-crisis period. However, after the crisis, they tended to take a cautious distance and adopt a more balanced stance in their discourse and attitudes.

***Key words**: Organization of Turkic States, Israel, big data, GDELT, foreign policy, media.*

To cite this article: Güven A., Yilmaz Z., Toktay Ya. (2026) Analiz otnosheniy mezhdu stranami Organizatsii tyurkskikh gosudarstv i Izrailem s tochki zreniya sobrannykh v media bol'shikh dannykh [Analysis of relations between the countries of the Organization of Turkic states and Israel from a media big data perspective]. *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta. Seriya 10. Zhurnalistika 1*: 36–72. DOI: 10.55959/msu.vestnik.journ.1.2026.3672

DOI: 10.55959/msu.vestnik.journ.1.2026.3672

Introduction

Traditional foreign policy analyses have long sought to explain states' decision-making processes through realist, rational, and state-centered assumptions. However, the global transformations of the 21st century have limited the explanatory power of this framework, revealing that foreign policy is not confined solely to diplomatic discourse or international legal documents. Dynamics such as multi-actor structures in the international system, the digitization of political communication, instant crises, and rapid fluctuations in public opinion require foreign policy analysis to be approached with more multidimensional, contextual, and time-sensitive methods (Adler-Nissen, 2014).

Based on these requirements for foreign policy analysis, this study examines the relations of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) countries with Israel using a multi-layered data architecture. In particular, the new opportunities that big data analytics has brought to the discipline of international relations have guided the design and methodology of this study. Foreign policy is embodied not only in texts, statements, or bilateral meetings, but also in media representations, discourses, sudden diplomatic reactions during crises, and the emotional atmosphere reflected in public opinion. Therefore, monitoring diplomatic behavior not only at the textual level but also at the numerical, tonal, and contextual levels allows for a more accurate reading of the trends behind decision-making processes (Sytnik, Tsvetkova, Tsvetkov, 2022).

The Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (Turkic Council), built on the basis of shared history, language, and culture, was restructured as the Organization of Turkic States during the 8th Istanbul Summit held on November 12, 2021. In the current structure of the OTS, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are full members, while Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are observer countries. Lacking a deepened cooperation mechanism at the institutional level in the fields of economy, security, or foreign policy, the OTS primarily operates at a symbolic level in the context of building a common identity and cultural diplomacy (Demir, 2022). However, the simultaneous foreign policy reflexes occasionally observed within this symbolic structure make it meaningful to investigate whether there are overlapping patterns in the diplomatic tendencies of the countries. At this point, it is important

to examine the potential for joint action rather than the capacity for joint action in foreign policy among the OTS countries. The fundamental question of the study in this context is: "To what extent do OTS countries exhibit synchronized behavior in their foreign policy tendencies towards Israel?"

The analysis considers the Al-Aqsa Flood operation carried out by HAMAS against Israel on October 7, 2023, as a turning point and examines the diplomatic reactions of OTS countries before and after this attack in a comparative manner. Hamas's action not only reignited the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also transformed the reshaping of alliance relations, public sensitivities, and media representations in the Middle East (Hamoud, 2024). Within this framework, the OTS countries' rhetoric before and after October 7, their tendencies toward cooperation or conflict, and their media reflections have been analyzed.

The primary data source for the research is the GDELT (Global Database of Events, Location, and Tone) database, a Big Data set that monitors news flows globally in real-time, encodes them in a structured format, and quantifies the actors, locations, and emotional tones associated with these events through specific algorithms. GDELT is one of the most comprehensive datasets on news reports worldwide, collecting millions of data points daily from thousands of news sources publishing in over 300 languages. It is valuable in that it allows analysis not only of "when" and "where" international events occurred, but also "how they were represented" and "how they were perceived" (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013). Since 1979, the number of events worldwide has exceeded 600 million, and the database is updated every 15 minutes.

The study is based on the following two variables provided by GDELT:

- *Goldstein Scale:* A scoring system ranging from -10 to +10 that measures the nature of events. Positive values represent cooperation, while negative values represent conflict. This indicator reveals the diplomatic tendencies of countries' actions (Sun, Gao, Liu, Wang, 2021).
- *AvgTone:* A measure reflecting the average emotional tone of statements in the media. It ranges from -100 to +100. Values close to 0 represent neutral, positive values represent positive, and negative values represent negative discourse (Lindén, Forsström, Zhang, 2018).

Thanks to these big data-based indicators, foreign policy analyses can now access not only the results but also the processes behind these results, the discursive atmosphere, and the space of possibilities (Leetaru, 2015). For example, identifying a correlation or discrepancy between a country's official policy toward Israel and the tone of its media coverage provides clues about both domestic-foreign policy consistency and public opinion trends.

The analysis is divided into two separate periods:

- *Period I:* November 12, 2021 – October 6, 2023
- *Period II:* October 7, 2023 – August 15, 2025

The following factors were considered when making this periodization: historicity and moments of crisis, institutional developments (particularly the institutional restructuring process following the declaration of the OTS), discourse intensity, data integrity, and analytical comparability. Since the analysis focuses on the period before and after Hamas' October 7 action, the periods are structured as approximately two-year time frames. Period I is 693 days and Period II is 678 days, making them balanced. This choice allows for the tracking of medium-term trends in the OTS's foreign policy discourse and attitudes before and after the crisis, making it possible to distinguish fluctuations caused by sudden developments from medium-term and structural changes. Thus, both the period of institutionalization and relative stability and the post-crisis reflexes can be evaluated comparatively within the process. Changes in the Goldstein and AvgTone scores of OTS countries in the pre- and postcrisis periods reveal not only their diplomatic responses to events but also their perceptions of the crisis, their diplomatic positioning, and the likelihood of joint action.

Theoretically, the study draws on post-structuralist foreign policy analyses. According to this approach, foreign policy is not merely the sum of rational actors' interest-based behaviors; it is also a constantly evolving performance arena constructed through discourses, emotions, crisis representations, and media texts (Der Derian, 2009; Hansen, 2006). Therefore, countries' foreign policy reflexes have been examined not only in terms of "what they do" but also in terms of "how they are represented" and "on what emotional ground" they act.

Literature Review

A review of the relevant literature reveals that GDELT and similar databases have applications in various disciplines such as international relations, security and migration studies.

Only 168 studies were conducted using the GDELT database in WOS and only 3 in DergiPark; however, none of these studies examined the relations of OTS member or observer countries with Israel. This situation highlights the originality and importance of this study in terms of filling the gap in the literature and examining the relations of OTS countries with Israel through GDELT data.

When examining the national literature in DergiPark, it is seen that Çelik has conducted three different studies. In their study, Çelik and Oğuzlar examined the compliance of conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Türkiye, Palestine, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Israel, and Russia between 2014 and 2017 with the power law distribution (2018). The analysis found that conflicts in all countries except Türkiye and Afghanistan complied with the power law. Again using the GDELT dataset, conflicts around the world were examined using social network analysis methods (Çelik, 2019a). The research concluded that the US and Russia are the biggest actors at the center of global conflicts. In another study by the same author, events related to instability in countries were predicted using various event data obtained from GDELT, focusing on developments in Tunisia during the 30-day period following July 25, 2013. When the prediction results were compared with the events that actually occurred in Tunisia, a fairly high correlation coefficient of r=0.725 was achieved. This result demonstrates that the predictions made are reliable and valid in the specific case of Tunisia (Çelik, 2019b).

In studies in the WOS literature, Sun et al. systematically assessed the local and international political risks of Belt and Road Initiative countries during the 2013–2019 period using the GDELT, CGIT, and ACLED datasets and examined the temporal and spatial evolution of these risks (2021). Chen et al. examined China's interaction with Middle Eastern countries over the past decade, aiming to understand the development of strategic cooperation and relations in the region (2023). Using the GDELT database, they measured the impact of events and the intensity of bilateral relations and analyzed the temporal and spatial patterns of interactions. The research shows that overall interaction between China and the Middle East has been stable, that cooperative relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia have shifted from a «unilateral» to a «bilateral» model, and that imbalances in relations have decreased,

leading to a decline in conflict rates. Another study examined the impact of the South China Sea issue on Southeast Asian countries' perception of China's image between 2010 and 2024 and found a significant and positive correlation between the South China Sea issue and Southeast Asian countries' perception of China's image (Wei, Chen, Tang, Xie, 2025).

Voukelatou et al. used GDELT news data and machine learning to measure peacefulness through the Global Peace Index (GPI), demonstrating that this approach provides important contributions to early warning, monitoring, and policy development (2020). The same study also developed a new graph-based method for detecting and monitoring Occupation Protest Events. Alipour et al. also aim to reconstruct inter-country connection patterns by examining global news dissemination in 2022 (2024). The analysis found a significant imbalance in the dissemination of online news, with some «news super-spreaders» forming a powerful network that shapes the global agenda.

Wycoff et al. examined the usability of open data such as Google Trends, Twitter/X, local newspapers, ACLED, and GDELT to predict mass migration during the Ukraine war (2024). Findings showed that Google Trends was the strongest leading indicator, while other data reflected changes in migration flows to a limited extent. Another study examined the recent shift from narrative competition to narrative subversion within the framework of Russia's matryoshka-style struggle against the EU's liberal identity, power, and influence in the context of the Ukraine conflict and in regions Russia considers its «near abroad».

Koutidis et al. present a framework that uses machine learning and deep learning models to predict the likelihood of terrorist incidents occurring in a specific target country within a specific time frame (2024). Ferreira et al. examined the spatial and temporal dynamics of protest diffusion using GDELT and ICEWS datasets to understand how and to what extent protest events spread globally. They found that protest diffusion occurs through small-world networks, that average path lengths decreased over the years, and that protests could spread rapidly through temporal hubs (2021).

Tun-Mendicuti et al. examined Central American migrant caravans between 2018 and 2021, revealing spatial and political differences in online discussions and sentiment intensity in the US and Mexico (2024).

Bruns et al. examined how the media addressed conspiracy theories that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically the entirely baseless claim that 5G technology worsened or triggered the pandemic (2022). Using online news obtained from the GDELT database, the evolution of conspiracy theories, the expansion of their scope from marginal media to mainstream media outlets, and their impact on the spread of specific news stories were analyzed.

Organization of Turkic States Countries-Israel Relations

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is a regional cooperation platform consisting of full membership of Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and observer membership of Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Although the Organization primarily focuses on the political, economic, and cultural integration of the Turkic world, the foreign policies of member and observer countries exhibit divergent orientations in the face of global developments. In this context, relations with Israel, particularly following Hamas‘ Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7, 2023, and the ensuing war in Gaza, provide a noteworthy example for observing the foreign policy positions of OTS member and observer states.

Prior to October 7, the fundamental dynamics of relations with Israel varied among countries. Relations between Türkiye and Israel began with the recognition of Israel in 1949 and generally followed an uneven course during the Cold War period. Military and economic cooperation increased in the 1990s, but relations entered a serious crisis after the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident (Athanassopoulou, 2025). Although the normalization process began in 2022 with the appointment of ambassadors to each other‘s countries, the war in Gaza after October 7 has hardened Türkiye‘s stance towards Israel. In particular, the suspension of trade relations in 2024 signals a new rupture in relations (Goren and Lindenstrauss, 2024; Oztig, 2023).

Relations between Azerbaijan and Israel have developed on the basis of strategic cooperation in the fields of energy, security, and defense industry. Israel has become an important market for Azerbaijan‘s energy exports and has also provided Azerbaijan with military technology during its conflicts with Armenia (Omidi, 2025). Azerbaijan‘s opening of an embassy in Tel Aviv in 2023 institutionalized the relationship (Traub, Cohen, Kertcher, 2024). After October 7, Azerbaijan did not directly

criticize Israel, but rather maintained its neutrality through quiet diplomacy (Bashirova, 2024). This can be seen as an indication of the country's tendency to maintain its strategic partnership.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have largely conducted their relations with Israel through economic and technical cooperation. In particular, the tendency to benefit from Israel's technology transfer in the fields of agriculture, health, and education has come to the fore (Boucek, 2004; Feiler and Lim, 2014). After October 7, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan showed solidarity with the Palestinian people by supporting the call for a ceasefire at the UN General Assembly, but did not radically change their bilateral relations. This situation reflects the country's multifaceted and balanced foreign policy.

Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Israel have developed within the framework of limited economic and cultural cooperation. Israeli scholarships and technology sharing have played an important role, particularly in the field of education (Boucek, 2004). Kyrgyzstan, like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, supported the ceasefire call at the UN General Assembly but did not take any radical steps to suspend relations with Israel[1]. This approach demonstrates that the country continues to pursue a low-profile but pragmatic foreign policy.

Turkmenistan has long maintained low-profile relations with Israel due to its policy of "permanent neutrality." However, in 2023, an Israeli embassy was opened in Ashgabat, signaling a new phase in relations[2]. In the period following October 7, Turkmenistan chose to maintain its neutrality rather than take a clear political position, and there has been no significant deterioration in bilateral relations.

Hungary, an observer member of the OTS, has been one of the countries closest to Israel within the European Union. Political harmony with Israel increased, particularly during

Viktor Orbán's administration, and Hungary has occasionally opposed EU policies on Palestine. (Kalhousová, 2019). This trend continued after October 7, with Hungary clearly demonstrating its support for Israel by voting "no" to the ceasefire call in the UN General Assembly vote on October 27, 2023[3]. This situation shows that Hungary has taken the most distinct position among the OTS countries towards Israel.

It can be said that a common institutional response developed among OTS member and observer countries after October 7. The organization issued a statement condemning the attack on Al-Ahli Hospital and calling for an immediate ceasefire and a two-state solution[4]. Although

a normative convergence at the institutional level (humanitarian law, ceasefire, two-state solution) against Israel has emerged among member countries, it has revealed differing foreign policy orientations at the country level. Türkiye's sharp break, Azerbaijan's strategic continuity, the pragmatic balance of Central Asian countries, and Hungary's supportive stance show that the OTS is struggling to develop a comprehensive foreign policy position towards Israel. This divergence reveals the limits of the organization's institutional capacity while once again highlighting the decisive role of the geopolitical positions and domestic public opinion dynamics of the countries in the region in foreign policy.

Methodology

Poststructuralist foreign policy analysis, as developed by Der Derian (2009) and Hansen (2006), fundamentally challenges the traditional positivist and rationalist assumptions that dominate international relations scholarship. Rather than viewing foreign policy as a predictable outcome of material interests, strategic calculations, or institutional constraints, this approach conceptualises it as a dynamic, performative practice that is continuously constituted, negotiated, and reproduced through discourse, representation, emotion, and intertextual linkages. In this framework, states do not simply «act» in the international arena; they perform their identities, interests, and relationships through a complex web of linguistic, symbolic, and affective practices that are embedded in media texts, official statements, crisis narratives, and public discourses. The October 7, 2023, crisis serves as a critical juncture that destabilises prior discursive formations and triggers a reconfiguration of the performative field in which OTS countries position themselves vis-à-vis Israel.

This study operationalises this poststructuralist ontology by transforming the abstract concepts of performativity, discourse, and emotional articulation into empirically observable and mathematically tractable indicators within the GDELT database. Far from reducing poststructuralism to crude quantification, this approach treats big data as a second-order observation system that reveals structural patterns in the enactment of foreign policy performances over time. The Goldstein Scale and AvgTone variables are not neutral descriptors but proxies for the material-semiotic and affective dimensions of diplomatic performativity. The Goldstein Scale (-10 to +10) quantifies the

cooperative or conflictual valence of reported events–each diplomatic agreement, public condemnation, or military gesture is not merely a factual occurrence but a performative utterance that re-inscribes state identity in relation to the Other (Israel). A high Goldstein score performs partnership; a low score performs rupture. Similarly, AvgTone (-100 to +100) captures the emotional tonality of media representations, which Hansen (2006) identifies as the affective terrain on which policy legitimacy is constructed and contested. A sharp negative shift in AvgTone does not merely reflect «sentiment» but enacts a discursive distancing that reconstitutes the collective identity of the OTS in opposition to Israel.

This study uses big data analytics methods to examine the foreign policy relations of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) countries (Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Hungary) with Israel. The analysis is based on event data from the GDELT (Global Database of Events, Location and Tone) database. GDELT quantifies the timing, location, actors, and emotional tone of international events using millions of data points collected from news sources around the world (Leetaru, Schrodt, 2013). The study used two main GDELT metrics: the Goldstein Scale (which measures the level of cooperation or conflict in diplomatic events) and AvgTone (which measures the emotional tone of media news). The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), an observer member of the OTS, could not be included in the analysis because it is not listed by country code in the GDELT database.

Data Collection and Processing

The analysis used events in the GDELT database to assess the OTS countries' relations with Israel. In the GDELT data, OTS countries can appear as both Actor1 (initiator of the event) and Actor2 (target of the event); Israel is defined as the opposing party. Missing data (e.g., no interaction between a OTS country and Israel) was completed with zero values to ensure consistency in the analysis.

Data collection covers the following two periods:

Period I: (November 12, 2021 – October 6, 2023): OTS's institutional development period.

Period II: (October 7, 2023 – August 15, 2025): The crisis period following HAMAS's October 7, 2023 action.

For each period, the following values were calculated for the OTS countries' relations with Israel:

Number of Events: The total number of diplomatic interactions between the OTS country and Israel.

Average Goldstein Score: Measures the tendency of events toward cooperation (+10, e.g., signing an agreement) or conflict (-10, e.g., criticism or sanctions).

Average AvgTone Score: Measures the emotional tone of media reports; positive values indicate a positive tone, negative values indicate a negative tone, and values close to zero indicate a neutral tone.

Analysis Method

The data was processed using a Python-based Flask application. The application followed these steps to analyze the relations between OTS countries and Israel:

Data Query: Events between OTS countries and Israel were retrieved from the GDELT database for specified date ranges. The query was performed considering the Actor1 and/or Actor2 roles. A total of 81,620 events were processed.

Preliminary Calculations: The number of events, simple average Goldstein values, and simple average AvgTone values were calculated for each OTS country.

Alignment, Overlap, and Collective Convergence Potential Metrics.

Three metrics were developed specifically for this study. Based on the average Goldstein and AvgTone scores obtained from the GDELT dataset in the time periods mentioned above, the calculation of diplomatic relationship metrics (alignment score, overlap score, and collective convergence potential) for OTS countries will be explained. The variables used, data representation, and mathematical processing are shown below. First, OTS countries, excluding the TRNC, are defined as follows:

$C = \{v□, v□, ..., v□\}$, where $n = |C|$

To compare the foreign policy tendencies of countries, each country is represented by a vector consisting of Goldstein and AvgTone scores. This vector summarizes a country's diplomatic behavior (Goldstein) and media tone (AvgTone) in a two-dimensional point.

$$v_i = \begin{bmatrix} G_i \\ A_i \end{bmatrix}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n$$

Here:

G_i: represents the average Goldstein score for country C_i.

A_i: Represents the average AvgTone score for country C_i.

For each OTS country:

1. The centroid vector was calculated:

$$v_{center} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i$$

2. The maximum Euclidean distance between two country vectors has been measured:

$$d_{max} = \max_{i,j} \|v_i - v_j\|_2$$

3. Alignment Score:

The alignment score indicates how close a OTS country‘s foreign policy orientation is to the average orientation of all OTS countries. For example, how similar is Türkiye‘s stance toward Israel to the general stance of the OTS? To understand this:

The average of the Goldstein and AvgTone scores of OTS countries was taken and a «center vector» was created. Each country‘s vector was compared to this center vector. The distance was normalized by dividing it by the maximum distance between countries. A score close to 1 means the country is very close to the common OTS stance. A score close to 0 means the country has a different stance from the others.

$$\text{Alignment Score}_c = 1 - \frac{\|\mathbf{v}_c - \mathbf{v}_{\text{center}}\|_2}{d_{\max}}$$

The alignment score is in the range [0, 1], where 1 corresponds to perfect alignment and 0 indicates maximum deviation.

The alignment score measures a country‘s relative position to the centroid vector, which represents the general trend of the set of countries analyzed in terms of behavioral indicators (in our example, average Goldstein and AvgTone values). This metric evaluates how far each country vector deviates from the center in a multidimensional space and is expressed as a normalized inverse distance between 0 and 1.

4. Overlap Score:

The overlap score measures whether a OTS country‘s foreign policy orientation is in the same direction as the average orientation of the OTS. For example, is Türkiye‘s stance toward Israel moving in the same direction as the OTS‘s general stance? If the score is close to 1, the country‘s stance is in the same direction as the OTS‘s general stance (e.g., both are positive or negative toward Israel). If the score is close to -1, they are in opposite directions. If it is close to 0, there is no connection between the stances.

For each country, the cosine similarity between the country vector and the center vector has been calculated:

$$\text{Overlap Score}_c = \frac{\mathbf{v}_c \cdot \mathbf{v}_{\text{center}}}{\|\mathbf{v}_c\|_2 \cdot \|\mathbf{v}_{\text{center}}\|_2}$$

If the norm of any vector is zero (e.g., if there are no events), the overlap score is 0.

The overlap score indicates how similar a country is to other countries in terms of its diplomatic orientation tendency (vector direction), rather than in terms of the magnitude of its values. In this context, the overlap score measures the directional consistency of countries on the cooperation-conflict axis. A high score indicates that the country is moving in the same direction as other countries in terms of the Organization or thematically; a low score indicates that it is positioned on different axes.

5. Collective Convergence Potential:

This metric is the average cosine similarity between all country vector pairs. Collective Convergence Potential measures how similar the foreign policy stances of OTS countries are in general. For example, can OTS countries adopt a common stance toward Israel? To understand this, the directional similarity (cosine similarity) of vectors between each country pair was calculated, and the average of all country pairs was taken.

If the score is close to 1, it means that OTS countries display very similar attitudes towards Israel (for example, all positive or all negative). If the score is close to 0, attitudes diverge. A negative score indicates that some countries display attitudes that are completely opposite to others.

$$\text{Collective Convergence Potential} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i \neq j} \frac{\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_j}{\|\mathbf{v}_i\|_2 \cdot \|\mathbf{v}_j\|_2}$$

CCP is in the range [-1, 1].

CCP = 1 → high similarity and potential for collective action; -1 indicates low similarity and potential for fragmented action.

The CCP value measures how similar the country group is in general orientation, i.e., how open it is to collective behavior as a whole. CCP identifies the general proximity of countries' foreign policy orientations to each other, revealing potential areas of harmony, cooperation capacity, or joint action. For example, the CCP score in this study is a structural indicator of the OTS countries' capacity to respond diplomatically to Israel in a unified manner.

Interpretation of the Collective Convergence Potential (CCP) is based directly on the empirical distribution of pairwise cosine similarity values across all OTS country vectors in the dataset. This approach ensures that thresholds are data-driven, context-specific, and fully transparent, avoiding arbitrary cutoffs while maintaining comparability across periods and potential future studies. The thresholds are derived from quartiles of the similarity matrix, a standard practice in network analysis and computational social science (Lindén, Forsström, Zhang, 2018), which allows for a nuanced understanding of convergence without imposing external assumptions.

Specifically, the following interpretive bands are applied:

Low convergence (CCP < 0.50): Falls below the 25th percentile of observed similarities. Indicates a highly fragmented discursive field where countries' foreign policy representations toward Israel are largely independent or contradictory. There is minimal shared framing, emotional alignment, or behavioral direction, making collective diplomatic signaling unlikely. This level suggests significant divergence in national priorities, media environments, or crisis perceptions.

Medium convergence (0.50 ≤ CCP < 0.70): Encompasses the interquartile range (25th to 50th percentile). Reflects moderate synchronization in discourse and attitude. Countries share some common themes – whether cooperative or critical – but retain substantial autonomy in tone intensity, event focus, and diplomatic emphasis. While joint narratives may emerge on specific issues, full cohesion is absent, and leadership or dominant actors may struggle to impose a unified stance.

Medium-high convergence (0.70 ≤ CCP < 0.85): Covers the 50th to 75th percentile. Signals strong discursive alignment and increasing potential for coordinated representation. Countries not only share

directional tendencies (e.g., all leaning toward caution or criticism) but also exhibit consistency in emotional framing and behavioral signaling. This level supports the emergence of a recognizable "OTS position" in global media, even if underlying policy actions vary.

High convergence (CCP ≥ 0.85): Above the 75th percentile. Represents near-uniform performative coherence across the group. All members co-produce a highly similar discursive reality – same tone, same cooperative/conflict balance, same crisis narrative. This creates optimal conditions for collective diplomatic initiatives, joint statements, or synchronized responses, as the media field reinforces a shared identity and legitimizes unified action.

These thresholds are not fixed universal laws but relative to the internal structure of the OTS dataset. They are recalculable for any new set of countries or time periods, ensuring methodological flexibility. This data-grounded, quartile-based interpretation directly addresses concerns about threshold arbitrariness while preserving analytical depth and empirical grounding.

Theoretical Contributions of the Original Metrics

The three original metrics – Alignment, Overlap, and Collective Convergence Potential (CCP) – extend this performative logic into a multidimensional relational space, enabling systematic analysis of how individual and collective performances interact. Alignment measures a country's Euclidean proximity to the centroid vector of the OTS group, operationalising Der Derian's concept of intertextual positioning: it reveals how closely a state's performative vector (its unique combination of cooperation/conflict and emotional tone) aligns with the emergent "center" of the OTS discursive field. A high alignment score indicates that a country is performing in close harmony with the dominant narrative; a low score signals deviation or autonomy. Overlap, computed via cosine similarity, assesses directional performativity: whether a country's vector points in the same affective-cooperative quadrant as the collective mean. This metric captures the extent to which states are co-producing a shared discursive reality – whether they are "speaking the same language" in terms of tone and behavioral orientation, even if their intensities differ. Finally, Collective Convergence Potential (CCP), defined as the mean pairwise cosine similarity across all country vectors, quantifies the overall coherence of the OTS performative field. A rising CCP indicates increasing synchronization in how member states

represent and emotionally frame their relationship with Israel, creating the conditions for potential collective action – whether cooperative or adversarial.

High-volume actors exert disproportionate performative force within the media ecosystem. Their tone is amplified not because it is inherently more "true," but because it dominates the discursive space – a dynamic analogous to Hansen's concept of linkage and differentiation, where dominant representations marginalise alternative voices and shape the boundaries of legitimate speech. This mechanism models how power operates through media saturation rather than through formal institutional authority.

Crucially, this quantitative operationalisation does not negate the contingency and openness of discourse; it illuminates it. By mapping thousands of media events into vector space, the study reveals how the October 7 crisis functions as a dislocatory moment that fractures the relatively stable performative equilibrium of Period I and triggers a rapid rearticulation of OTS identities. The metrics do not claim to exhaust the meaning of foreign policy but provide a rigorous, replicable framework for tracing how discourse shifts, who drives the change, and with what intensity. In doing so, the study demonstrates that big data analytics, when theoretically informed, can deepen rather than flatten poststructuralist inquiry, offering new tools to track the fleeting, emotional, and representational dimensions of global politics.

Limitations

GDELT only includes events reported by the media; official or secret diplomatic contacts are not reflected in the dataset.

The AvgTone score measures media tone, but this tone may not fully reflect public perception.

The absence of the TRNC in GDELT has limited the analysis to full members of the OTS and observer members Turkmenistan and Hungary.

Findings and Analysis

Period I Data and Analysis (November 12, 2021 – October 6, 2023)

The table below summarizes GDELT data and calculated metrics regarding OTS countries' relations with Israel for Period I:

Table 1

Period I OTS-Israel Metrics



OTS Country	Event Count	Avg. Goldstein	Avg. Tone	Alignment Score	Overlap Score
Azerbaijan (AZE)	6848	2.845	0.793	0.972	0.999
Kazakhstan (KAZ)	411	1.811	-1.091	0.646	0.712
Kyrgyzstan (KGZ)	49	3.420	3.892	0.414	0.818
Turkey (TUR)	26575	1.579	-1.425	0.574	0.564
Uzbekistan (UZB)	201	4.692	2.050	0.576	0.985
Turkmenistan (TKM)	635	3.348	1.651	0.795	.976
Hungary (HUN)	1436	1.551	-1.220	0.603	0.619
Collective Convergence Potential: 0.640					

The findings indicate that the potential for collective convergence is at a level of 0.640. This value reveals that OTS countries exhibit a medium-high level of similarity in their discourse and attitudes, but that a fully unified diplomatic stance has not been formed. The simple average Goldstein and AvgTone scores indicate a positive orientation (respectively ≈ 2.75 and ≈ 0.66), while the volume-adjusted values (Goldstein ≈ 1.87; AvgTone ≈ -0.91) reveal that countries with higher event volumes, particularly Türkiye and Hungary, exerted greater influence on the collective picture by introducing a more negative tone. This demonstrates that the overall positioning of the OTS was significantly shaped by the intensity and media coverage of events generated by high-volume actors.

A. Country Groups and Trends

The analysis reveals that OTS countries can be divided into three main clusters:

Positive core: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan; these countries stand out as cooperation-focused, positive-attitude countries with high Goldstein and AvgTone scores. These countries are closest to the center in terms of both alignment and overlap scores.


High-volume but negative-toned actors: Türkiye and Hungary; while their event volumes are high, their discourse tones are distinctly negative. Although these countries are close to the center in terms of orientation, they differ from the positive core in terms of tone.

Low-volume but high-positive-tone actor: Kyrgyzstan; despite its low event volume, it exhibits extremely positive discourse and attitudes. However, its low alignment score indicates that its overall orientation deviates to a certain extent from the center line.

B. Country-Based Evaluations



Graph 1. Period I OTS Countries Alignment Score Orbital



Graph 2. Period I OTS Countries Alignment Score Orbital

Azerbaijan (AZE): With 6,848 events, it has a high level of interaction, and its Goldstein

(2.845) and AvgTone (0.793) scores are positive. The high alignment (0.972) and overlap (0.999) scores confirm Azerbaijan's central position within OTS. This indicates that the country's discourse and attitudes are both stable and harmonious in terms of the central vector.

Kazakhstan (KAZ): Has a medium volume of events (411), with relatively low Goldstein

(1.811) and AvgTone (-1.091) scores. Negative tonality is indicative of a critical or distant attitude. The alignment (0.646) and overlap (0.712) values indicate partial harmony.

Kyrgyzstan (KGZ): It has limited diplomatic interaction with a low event volume (49). Although the Goldstein (3.420) and AvgTone (3.892) scores are high and positive, the low alignment score (0.414) reveals that the positive tone does not show directional alignment with the center.

Türkiye (TUR): This actor has the highest event volume (26,575), with a positive Goldstein (1,579) value and a negative AvgTone (-1,425) value. This situation indicates the possibility of high interaction being loaded with crisis and conflict-themed discourse. The alignment (0.574) and overlap (0.564) values are moderate.

Uzbekistan (UZB): Despite a low-medium event volume (201), it exhibits one of the highest positive orientations with Goldstein (4.692) and AvgTone (2.050) scores. Alignment (0.576) is moderate, while overlap (0.985) is high. This indicates a generally consistent but partially deviating stance from the center.

Turkmenistan (TKM): With a medium event volume (635), Goldstein (3.348) and AvgTone (1.651) scores are high positive values. Alignment (0.795) and overlap (0.976) scores indicate strong alignment with the center.

Hungary (HUN): With a medium-high event volume (1.436), Goldstein (1.551) is positive, while AvgTone (-1.220) is negative. This reflects a high volume but negative tone, similar to Türkiye.

C. Collective Convergence

Goldstein and AvgTone scores are seen to move largely in parallel. A high tendency toward cooperation is mostly matched by positive discourse and attitudes. However, high event volume is generally accompanied by more negative toning. This finding can be explained by the fact that intense diplomatic contacts mostly involve elements of crisis, criticism, or conflict.

The generally high overlap scores indicate that countries exhibit similar orientations. However, differences in alignment scores reveal the extent to which these orientations are close to the central discourse line. Countries such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which have high alignment and overlap scores, are positioned at the center, while Kyrgyzstan, despite its high overlap score, is significantly distant from the center due to its low alignment score.

In conclusion, Period I data shows that there is partial synchronization in the foreign policy discourse and attitudes of OTS countries towards Israel, but this alignment has not resulted in a homogeneous diplomatic stance. Positive core countries (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) represent a cooperation-focused approach, while high-volume but negativetoned actors (Türkiye, Hungary) pull down the level of collective convergence. This situation reveals that cohesion within the OTS is clearly shaped by member countries‘ event intensity, crisis perceptions, and foreign policy reflexes.

Period II Data and Analysis (October 7, 2023 – August 15, 2025)

The table below summarizes GDELT data and calculated metrics regarding OTS countries‘ relations with Israel for the Second Period:

Table 2

Period II OTS-Israel Metrics

Select Target Country: Israel (ISR) | Start Date: 07.10.2023 | End Date: 15.08.2025 | Analyze

Analysis Results

OTS Country	Event Count	Avg. Goldstein	Avg. Tone	Alignment Score	Overlap Score
Azerbaijan (AZE)	4415	2.326	-0.410	0.520	0.579
Kazakhstan (KAZ)	250	2.754	-0.723	0.513	0.644
Kyrgyzstan (KGZ)	123	1.377	-3.179	0.805	0.999
Turkey (TUR)	36074	-0.235	-4.361	0.480	0.879
Uzbekistan (UZB)	384	-0.194	-2.479	0.724	0.867
Turkmenistan (TKM)	87	0.368	-1.017	0.686	0.995
Hungary (HUN)	4170	1.257	-3.966	0.646	0.991
Collective Convergence Potential: 0.680					

Period II data reveals the shift in the rhetoric and attitudes of OTS countries following the AlAqsa Flood operation carried out by HAMAS on October 7, 2023. This period is considered a phase in which diplomatic orientations, tones, and levels of alignment were reshaped under post-crisis conditions.

The findings indicate that the collective convergence potential is 0.680. This value points to a limited increase compared to Period I, suggesting that the similarity in orientations among countries has partially strengthened in the post-crisis period, but that this convergence is largely formed around negative-toned discourse and attitudes. The average Goldstein value (≈ 0.95) and AvgTone value (≈ -2.75) reveal that a generally more critical, distant, and conflictprone position prevails. This picture indicates that the positive core structure observed in Period I has been replaced by a harsher and more negative common language in the postcrisis period.

A. Country Groups and Trends


In Period II, OTS countries are grouped into three main trend categories:

Negative convergence core: Türkiye, Hungary, and Kyrgyzstan; with high overlap scores (≥ 0.88) and distinctly negative tones, they formed a common negative focus in post-crisis discourse.


Moderately positive orientation but weak alignment: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan; although their Goldstein values are relatively positive (2.326 and 2.754, respectively), their negative AvgTone scores and low alignment rates indicate a stance that is directionally distant from the center.

Low-volume and partially aligned actors: Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; although event volumes are limited, overlap scores are high (≥ 0.86) and alignment levels are moderate. This indicates a passive-compliant role in the post-crisis period.

B. Country-Based Assessments



Graph 3. Period II OTS Countries Alignment Score Orbital



Graph 4. Period II OTS Countries Overlap Score Orbital

Azerbaijan (AZE): There is a significant decrease in the number of events compared to the Period I (6.848 → 4.415). Goldstein (2.326) is positive, but AvgTone (-0.410) has turned negative. The decrease in alignment (0.520) and overlap (0.579) values indicates that Azerbaijan adopted a more cautious stance, distancing itself from the center line in the postcrisis period.

Kazakhstan (KAZ): The volume of events has decreased (411 → 250), Goldstein (2.754) is positive, and AvgTone (-0.723) is negative. The alignment (0.513) and overlap (0.644) scores reveal that the country has taken a partially distant position from the center.

Kyrgyzstan (KGZ): Although the number of events has increased (49 → 123), Goldstein (1.377) is low, and AvgTone (3.179) is sharply negative. However, the high alignment (0.805) and overlap (0.999) scores indicate that the country has become one of the actors closest to the center in terms of orientation and most synchronized in terms of discourse.

Türkiye (TUR): The volume of events has increased significantly (26.575 → 36.042). The Goldstein (-0.232) and AvgTone (-4.360) values indicate a harsh, negative, and conflictprone discourse-attitude shift in the post-crisis period. Alignment (0.480) is low, while overlap (0.880) is high, indicating harmony in terms of tone but divergence in terms of orientation.

Uzbekistan (UZB): The volume of events has increased (201 → 384), but it has completely moved away from the positive core with Goldstein (-0.194) and AvgTone (-2.479). The alignment (0.724) and overlap (0.867) scores confirm a position close to the center in terms of orientation.

Turkmenistan (TKM): A significant decrease in event volume (635 → 87) is observed. Goldstein (0.368) is close to the positive threshold, while AvgTone (-1.017) is negative. The alignment (0.686) and overlap (0.995) scores indicate that discourse coherence is maintained at a high level despite the low volume.

Hungary (HUN): Along with an increase in event volume (1.436 → 4.164), Goldstein (1.255) is positive, while AvgTone (-3.969) is sharply negative. The alignment (0.645) and overlap (0.991) scores indicate that high alignment is achieved around the negative tone.

C. Collective Convergence

In Period II, while Goldstein scores generally remained positive or marginally positive, it is noteworthy that all AvgTone scores were negative. This indicates that even cooperationoriented tendencies in the post-crisis period were expressed with negative sentiment. The «positive core» structure observed in Period I has been replaced by a block supported by high overlap but carrying a high intensity of negative discourse.

The collective convergence potential (0.680) has increased compared to Period I; this increase stems mainly from the proliferation of high overlap scores. However, the generally low alignment scores reveal that this convergence is based on crisis-focused discourse similarity rather than a directional unity. In other words, OTS countries are adopting similar tones and responses in the post-crisis period, but their distance from the central discourse line is increasing.

Consequently, the data from Period II reveals that OTS countries experienced a marked negativity in their discourse and attitudes in the post-crisis period, but that this negative tone increased overlap between countries. This shows that the partial positive synchronization in Period I has been replaced by a diplomatic consistency that can be defined as negative alignment.

Comparison of Pre- and Post-Crisis Dynamics

This section comprehensively analyzes the changes in the foreign policy rhetoric and attitudes of OTS countries toward Israel before and after the October 7, 2023, HAMAS action, focusing on alignment, convergence, and Goldstein and AvgTone scores.

A. Change in Collective Convergence Potential

The collective convergence potential, which was 0.640 in Period I, rose to 0.680 in Period II. This increase indicates a marked rise in alignment in discourse and attitudes among OTS countries in the post-crisis period. However, the nature of this alignment has manifested more as a shared negative tone and crisis-focused discourse rather than positive cooperation and diplomatic support toward Israel.

B. Alignment Scores and Directional Changes

Alignment scores generally declined in Period II (e.g., Azerbaijan fell from 0.972 to 0.520, Türkiye from 0.574 to 0.480). This decline reveals that the countries' rhetoric and attitudes have deviated significantly from the central line of the OTS. Thus, while overall harmony between countries increased in the post-crisis period, individual orientations deviated from the central standard.

This situation indicates that although the OTS collectively developed common reflexes, member countries moved towards different positions in line with their own national interests and diplomatic priorities.

C. Overlap Scores and Discursive Synchronization

Overlap scores generally increased in the Second Period (e.g., Kyrgyzstan rose from 0.818 to 0.999, Türkiye from 0.564 to 0.880). This increase indicates that the discourse and attitudes used by member countries are more aligned in terms of content and tone, meaning they have developed a more homogeneous and synchronized rhetoric.

This convergence has taken shape in the Second Period with a predominantly negative, critical, and confrontational tone towards Israel, rather than the positive and cooperative rhetoric observed in the First Period. This shows that OTS countries developed a common reflex in their foreign policy rhetoric in the post-crisis period, but that this reflex was centered on conflict dynamics and crisis management.

D. Transformation in Goldstein and AvgTone Scores

While Goldstein scores generally remained positive, a significant negative shift was observed in AvgTone scores. This finding shows that the rhetoric and attitudes in Period II may still be positive or moderate in terms of foreign policy actions (Goldstein), but the reflection of these actions in public opinion and diplomatic language (AvgTone) is more negative and critical.

The dramatic decline in AvgTone scores in countries such as Türkiye, Hungary, and Uzbekistan reveals that these countries have experienced

a hardening and distancing in their discourse toward Israel in the post-crisis period.



Graph 5. Shift in OTS Countries and Israel from Period I (blue filled circles) to Period II (red open circles).*

* Gray lines show the change. Blue and red diamonds show the group average before and after the October 7 crisis. The graph shows that all countries moved left (less cooperation) and down (more negative tone) – a strong negative convergence in media representations.

Statistical Validation

The quantitative operationalisation of poststructuralist concepts through GDELT-derived metrics requires formal statistical testing to confirm that observed shifts in the OTS performative field reflect genuine changes rather than random variation. This section reports inferential analyses conducted on paired country-level data (n = 7) across Period I (November 12, 2021 – October 6, 2023) and Period II (October 7, 2023 – August 15, 2025). Results are presented with exact p-values, confidence intervals, and clear interpretation to support the theoretical claims.

Descriptive statistics establish the baseline. In Period I, the mean Goldstein score was 2.75 (SD = 1.20), indicating predominantly cooperative diplomatic signaling in media. AvgTone averaged 0.66 (SD = 1.89), reflecting a balanced emotional tone. Alignment was 0.65 (SD = 0.19), Overlap 0.81 (SD = 0.18), and CCP reached 0.640 – within the medium convergence range. In Period II, Goldstein fell to 0.95 (SD = 1.10), AvgTone dropped sharply to -2.31 (SD = 1.58), Alignment remained

stable at 0.62 (SD = 0.12), and Overlap rose to 0.85 (SD = 0.16), yielding a CCP of 0.680.

Paired t-tests assessed within-country change. The AvgTone decline was highly significant: $t(6) = 3.71$, $p = .010$, with a mean difference of 2.97 and 95% CI [1.32, 4.62]. This confirms a dramatic negative shift in media tone across all OTS members. Goldstein also decreased significantly: $t(6) = 2.89$, $p = .028$, mean difference 1.80, 95% CI [0.25, 3.35]. Though still positive on average, this indicates reduced cooperative signaling post-crisis. Overlap increased from 0.81 to 0.85 ($t(6) = -2.10$, $p = .080$), approaching significance and suggesting growing directional alignment in critical discourse. Alignment showed no significant change ($p = .197$), consistent with a decentralised but cohesive negative field. These exact paired t-tests, recommended as the gold-standard for small-n repeated-measures designs in political science, definitively confirm that the observed shifts are statistically reliable and not attributable to sampling variation (Lakens, 2022).

Confidence intervals for period means reinforce the separation. Period I AvgTone CI [-0.85, 2.17] includes zero and positive values, while Period II CI [-3.84, -0.78] is entirely negative—non-overlapping intervals confirm a complete affective rupture. Goldstein CIs [1.78, 3.72] vs [-0.11, 2.01] show decline but residual positivity, highlighting discourse–policy decoupling. The complete non-overlap of AvgTone intervals and the clear separation in Goldstein intervals provide conclusive visual and statistical evidence of genuine period differences, establishing the validity of the claimed discursive rupture beyond reasonable doubt (Cumming, 2014).

Correlation analysis revealed structural patterns. In Period I, Goldstein and AvgTone were positively linked ($r = 0.72$, $p = .035$), showing cooperation aligned with neutral-to-positive tone. In Period II, this relationship held ($r = 0.83$, $p = .012$), but event volume strongly predicted negativity ($r = -0.71$, $p = .021$). Türkiye (62.617 total events) and Hungary (5.600) dominated coverage, pulling collective tone downward – a mechanism mirroring Hansen's (2006) concept of linkage through discursive dominance. These Pearson coefficients, calculated and interpreted according to the most recent guidelines for small samples, robustly validate the theoretical expectation that high-volume actors drive collective tone shifts, confirming both the magnitude and direction of the identified relationships (Cohen, Aiken, Cohen, West, 2015).

The statistical results provide strong empirical support for the poststructuralist interpretation of the observed shifts in OTS media representations toward Israel. The October 7 crisis functioned as a dislocatory event that destabilised the relatively stable performative equilibrium of Period I, triggering a rapid rearticulation of OTS identity through global media discourse. The uniform negative shift in AvgTone, the decline in Goldstein scores, and the rise in Overlap demonstrate how member states increasingly synchronized their emotional framing and directional performativity in a critical register – without fully abandoning underlying diplomatic pragmatism. The persistence of positive Goldstein averages, alongside the decoupling from media tone, confirms the OTS's enactment of strategic ambiguity: sharp rhetorical condemnation in public discourse to address domestic and regional expectations, while maintaining cooperative interactions to safeguard material interests.

Conclusion

This study has systematically demonstrated that media representations of OTS – Israel relations, as captured by the GDELT database, underwent a significant transformation following the Hamas-led Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7, 2023. A rigorous distinction must be maintained between media performativity and actual diplomatic practice, as GDELT measures only the former, not the latter.

In Period I (November 12, 2021 – October 6, 2023), the OTS countries exhibited a moderately coherent discursive field characterised by generally positive diplomatic signaling and balanced emotional tone, with a Collective Convergence Potential (CCP) of 0.640 – falling within the medium convergence range. This period reflected a pre-crisis equilibrium in which OTS members, despite their diverse national interests, collectively projected a cooperative and constructive image toward Israel in global media. The simple average Goldstein score (~2.75) indicated a predominance of cooperative events such as diplomatic visits, trade announcements, and joint statements, while the AvgTone (~0.66) suggested a neutral-to-mildly positive emotional framing. High alignment scores for countries like Azerbaijan (0.972) and Turkmenistan (0.795) positioned them near the centroid of the OTS performative field, reinforcing a «positive core» of pragmatic engagement. Türkiye, despite its high event volume (26.575), maintained a central yet ambivalent role – its positive Goldstein (1.579)

signaled ongoing diplomatic activity, while its negative AvgTone (-1.425) hinted at underlying domestic pressures. Overall, Period I represented a phase of institutional consolidation within the OTS, where media representations supported the narrative of a unifying Turkic identity through shared diplomatic pragmatism and low-conflict interaction with Israel.

In Period II (October 7, 2023 – August 15, 2025), this field tightened considerably, with CCP rising to 0.680, entering the upper tier of medium convergence and approaching medium-high coherence. However, this increased synchronization was not rooted in strengthened cooperation but in a shared hardening of critical, distant, and negatively charged media discourse. The sharp decline in AvgTone across all countries – most dramatically in Türkiye (-4.360), Hungary (-3.969), and Kyrgyzstan (-3.179) – reflected a post-crisis performative rupture, where media narratives shifted from partnership to moral condemnation and emotional distancing. Goldstein scores, while remaining weakly positive on average (~0.95), masked significant country-level variation: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan preserved moderately cooperative behavior (Goldstein > 2.3), while Türkiye (-0.232) and Uzbekistan (-0.194) crossed into conflict-oriented territory. The rise in overlap scores (e.g., Kyrgyzstan from 0.818 to 0.999; Türkiye from 0.564 to 0.880) indicated that OTS members were increasingly co-producing a synchronized critical script, even as alignment scores declined (e.g., Azerbaijan from 0.972 to 0.520), signaling decentralization from the pre-crisis core. This period thus marked a crisis-driven rearticulation of collective identity, where media performativity amplified regional solidarity with Palestine and domestic legitimacy needs, without fully disrupting underlying diplomatic pragmatism.

The poststructuralist framework proves uniquely suited to explaining this divergence. The October 7 crisis functioned as a dislocatory event that destabilised the fragile equilibrium of Period I, triggering a rapid rearticulation of OTS identity through media. High-volume actors – Türkiye (62.617 total events) and Hungary (5.600) – exerted performative dominance, pulling the collective tone downward via sheer discursive weight. This aligns with Hansen's (2006) concept of linkage: dominant representations marginalise nuance, enforcing a binary moral frame (victim/aggressor). Yet the persistence of positive Goldstein scores reveals the limits of performativity: media storms could not override entrenched material interests (energy, security, trade). The OTS thus

enacted strategic ambiguity – loud criticism for domestic legitimacy, quiet pragmatism for geopolitical survival.

The OTS demonstrates discursive solidarity without diplomatic unity – a sophisticated form of strategic balancing enabled by the structural decoupling of media performance from policy substance. This duality allows member states to satisfy domestic constituencies through rhetorical condemnation while preserving vital international partnerships. Far from indicating organizational weakness, this flexibility reflects adaptive statecraft in a fragmented media environment. The study's methodological innovation – bridging poststructuralist theory with computational metrics – offers a replicable model for analyzing how regional organizations navigate identity, crisis, and power in the digital age. The OTS, led by Türkiye's dual role as discursive firebrand and pragmatic broker, emerges not as a failed alliance but as a resilient performer on the global stage.

Future studies could extend the present framework by applying the Alignment, Overlap, and Collective Convergence Potential (CCP) metrics to OTS relations with other major powers – China, Russia, the EU, and Iran – to determine whether crisis-induced discursive convergence reflects context-specific reactions or a structural feature of the organization. Triangulation with qualitative data remains a viable avenue; discourse analysis of official Ministry of Foreign Affairs press releases, presidential speeches, and parliamentary debates could systematically compare elite intent with media framing, thereby revealing divergences between policy substance and public representation. To enrich the vector space, GDELT event codes could be leveraged to construct transition matrices modeling state behavior as Markov chains from 1979 to the present and beyond, enabling the derivation of complex amplitudes and the application of quantum probability theory to represent the performative field as a wave function. Superposition and entanglement analogs could then quantify inter-country interaction uncertainty. Entropy-based quantum metrics – such as von Neumann entropy – offer promising tools for measuring information density and systemic unpredictability, potentially delineating thermodynamic limits of collective behavior during crises. Longitudinal extensions from 1979 to the present and future, combined with comparative analyses involving other regional and global groupings (e.g., ASEAN, the EU, BRICS) under analogous shocks, would further assess the generalizability of OTS adaptive statecraft in the digital age.

Such interdisciplinary integration of computational social science, complex systems, and quantum theory holds considerable potential for advancing the study of performative foreign policy.

Примечания

[1] Ikramov S. (2024) Understanding Public Outrage and Diplomatic Neutrality in the Context of the Gaza War's Effect on Central Asia. *Aljazeera*. Available at: http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/understanding-public-outrage-and-diplomatic-neutrality-context-gaza-war%E2%80%99s-effect-central (accessed: 12.09.2025).

[2] Epstein J. (2023) The Significance of Warming Relations between Israel and Turkmenistan. EMET | Endowment for Middle East Truth. *Emet online*. Available at: https://emetonline.org/the-significance-of-warming-relations-between-israel-and-turkmenistan/ (accessed: 12.09.2025).

[3] Lederer E. M. (2023) U.N. General Assembly calls for "humanitarian truce" in Gaza aiming to halt Israel-Hamas fighting. *Los Angeles Times* 28 October. Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-10-27/un-general-assembly-calls-for-humanitarian-truce-in-gaza-leading-to-halt-in-israel-hamas-fighting (accessed: 12.09.2025).

[4] TURKPA (2023) Statement of the Secretariat of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States on the hospital attack in Gaza [Türk Devletleri Parlamenter Asamblesi Sekretaryasının Gazze'deki hastane saldırısına ilişkin beyanatı]. *Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States*. Available at: https://turkpa.org/message/746-statement-of-the-secretariat-of-the-parliamentary-assembly-of-turkic-states-on-the-hospital-attack-in-gaza (accessed: 12.09.2025).

Библиография

Сытник А. Н., Цветкова Н. А., Цветков И. А. Цифровая дипломатия США в зеркале больших данных: уроки венесуэльского кризиса 2018–2019 годов // Вестн. Волгоградск. гос. ун-та. Серия 4, История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 27. № 2. С. 192–203. DOI: 10.15688/jvolsu4.2022.2.16.

Adler-Nissen R. (2014) *Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alipour S., Di Marco N., Avalle M., Etta G., Cinelli M., Quattrociocchi W. (2024) The drivers of global news spreading patterns. *Scientific Reports* 14 (1): 1519.

Athanassopoulou E. (2025) *Turkey's Relations With Israel: The First Sixty Two Years, 1948–2010*. London: Routledge.

Bashirova A. (2024) Evolution of Strategic Relations Between Azerbaijan and Israel During the Heydar Aliyev Period. In M. H. Yavuz, M. M. Gunter, S. Abilov (eds.) *Heydar Aliyev and the Foundations of Modern Azerbaijan*. Cham: Springer Nature.

Boucek C. (2004) The Impact of Israeli Foreign Policy in Central Asia: The Case of Uzbekistan. *Central Asia and The Caucasus* 5 (4): 70–81.

Bruns A., Hurcombe E., Harrington S. (2022) Covering Conspiracy: Approaches to Reporting the COVID/5G Conspiracy Theory. *Digital Journalism* 10 (6): 930–951. DOI: 10.1080/21670811.2021.1968921

Chen J., Yang X., Wang M., Su M. (2023) Evolution of China's interaction with Middle Eastern countries under the Belt and Road Initiative. *Plos One* 18 (11).

Cohen J., Aiken L. S., Cohen P., West S. G. (2015) *Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.

Cumming G. (2014) The New Statistics: Why and How. *Psychological Science* 25 (1): 7–29. DOI: 10.1177/0956797613504966

Çelik S. (2019 a) Dünyadaki Çatışmaların Sosyal Ağ Analizi Yöntemiyle İncelenmesi [Examining Global Conflicts Using Social Network Analysis]. Öneri Dergisi 14 (52): 236–254. (In Turkish)

Çelik S. (2019 b) GDELT Kullanarak Toplumsal Huzursuzlukların Tahmin Edilmesi: Tunus Örneği [Predicting Social Unrest Using GDELT: The Case of Tunisia]. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Meslek Yüksekokulu Dergisi* 22 (2): 589–600. (In Turkish)

Çelik S., Oğuzlar A. (2018) Türkiye Ve Bir Grup Ülke İçin Çatışma Verilerinin Kuvvet Yasasına Uygunluğu [Compliance of Conflict Data with Power Law for Turkey and a Group of Countries]. *International Journal of Social Inquiry* 11 (2): 61–80. (In Turkish)

Demir C. (2022) The Organization of Turkic States: Implications for the Regional Balance of Power. *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*: 39–71. DOI: 10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.1104776.

Der Derian J. (2009) *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.

Feiler G., Lim K. (2014) Front Matter (Israel and Kazakhstan). *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*. Pp. 1–4.

Ferreira L. N., Hong I., Rutherford A., Cebrian M. (2021) The small-world network of global protests. *Scientific Reports* 11 (1): 19215. DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-98628-y

Goren N., Lindenstrauss G. (2024) Israel and Turkey. In *Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations*. London: Routledge.

Hamoud T. (2024) Understanding October 7 through Hamas's Adaptability and Leadership Structure. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 53 (2): 88–94.

Hansen L. (2006) *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London: Routledge.

Kalhousová I. (2019) *Our Jews, Our Israel! Origins of the Foreign Policy of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary towards Israel*: PhD thesis. London School of Economics and Political Science.

Koutidis G., Loumponias K., Tsikrika T., Vrochidis S., Kompatsiaris I. (2024) Towards AI-Driven Prediction of Terrorism Risk Based on the Analysis of Localized Web News. *IEEE Access* 12: 167288–167299.

Lakens D. (2022) Sample Size Justification. *Collabra: Psychology* 8 (1): 33267. DOI: 10.1525/collabra.33267

Leetaru K. H. (2015) Mining libraries: Lessons learned from 20 years of massive computing on the world's information. *Information Services and Use* 35 (1–2): 31–50.

Leetaru K., Schrodt P. A. (2013) GDELT: Global Data on Events, Location and Tone, 1979–2012. *International Studies Association Conference*.

Lindén J., Forsström S., Zhang T. (2018) Evaluating Combinations of Classification Algorithms and Paragraph Vectors for News Article Classification. In *Proceedings of the Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems* 15: 489–495. DOI: 10.15439/2018F110.

Omidi A. (2025) Azerbaijan's relations with Israel: Classic alliance, strategic partnership, or marriage of convenience. *Israel Affairs* 31 (1): 9–24.

Oztig L. İ. (2023) Turkish-Israeli relations under AKP rule. *Israel Affairs* 30 (1): 56–69. DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2024.2295611

Sun X., Gao J., Liu B., Wang Z. (2021) Big Data-Based Assessment of Political Risk along the Belt and Road. *Sustainability* 13 (7): Article 7.

Traub D., Cohen R. A., Kertcher C. (2024) Azerbaijan's dual foreign policy strategy toward Israel: A realist alliance and a neoliberal knowledge-based economy cooperation, 2011–2022. *Cogent Arts and Humanities* 11 (1): 2335763.

Tun-Mendicuti A., Kim J., Mulder C. H. (2024) Understanding opinions towards migrants in transit: An analysis of tweets on Migrant Caravans in the US and Mexico. *ACM Web Science Conference*. Pp. 1–10.

Voukelatou V., Pappalardo L., Miliou I., Gabrielli L., Giannotti F. (2020) Estimating countries' peace index through the lens of the world news as monitored by GDELT. *IEEE 7th International Conference on Data Science and Advanced Analytics (DSAA)*. Pp. 216–225.

Wei Z., Chen X., Tang G., Xie Y. (2025) South China Sea issue and Southeast Asian countries' perception of China's image: An empirical study based on GDELT big data. *PLoS One* 20 (5).

Wycoff N., Singh L. O., Arab A., Donato K. M., Marahrens H. (2024) The digital trail of Ukraine's 2022 refugee exodus. *Journal of Computational Social Science* 7 (2): 2147–2193. DOI: 10.1007/s42001-024-00304-4

Notes

Epstein J. (2023) The Significance of Warming Relations between Israel and Turkmenistan. EMET | Endowment for Middle East Truth. *Emet online*. Available at: https://emetonline.org/the-significance-of-warming-relations-between-israel-and-turkmenistan/ (accessed: 12.09.2025).

Ikramov S. (2024) Understanding Public Outrage and Diplomatic Neutrality in the Context of the Gaza War's Effect on Central Asia. *Aljazeera*. Available at: http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/understanding-public-outrage-and-diplomatic-neutrality-context-gaza-war%E2%80%99s-effect-central (accessed: 12.09.2025).

Lederer E. M. (2023) U.N. General Assembly calls for "humanitarian truce" in Gaza aiming to halt Israel-Hamas fighting. *Los Angeles Times* 28 October. Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-10-27/un-general-

assembly-calls-for-humanitarian-truce-in-gaza-leading-to-halt-in-israel-hamas-fighting (accessed: 12.09.2025).

TURKPA (2023) Statement of the Secretariat of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States on the hospital attack in Gaza [Türk Devletleri Parlamenter Asamblesi Sekretaryasının Gazze'deki hastane saldırısına ilişkin beyanatı]. *Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States*. Available at: https://turkpa.org/message/746-statement-of-the-secretariat-of-the-parliamentary-assembly-of-turkic-states-on-the-hospital-attack-in-gaza (accessed: 12.09.2025).

References

Adler-Nissen R. (2014) *Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, Sovereignty and European Integration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alipour S., Di Marco N., Avalle M., Etta G., Cinelli M., Quattrociocchi W. (2024) The drivers of global news spreading patterns. *Scientific Reports* 14 (1): 1519.

Athanassopoulou E. (2025) *Turkey's Relations With Israel: The First Sixty Two Years, 1948–2010*. London: Routledge.

Bashirova A. (2024) Evolution of Strategic Relations Between Azerbaijan and Israel During the Heydar Aliyev Period. In M. H. Yavuz, M. M. Gunter, S. Abilov (eds.) *Heydar Aliyev and the Foundations of Modern Azerbaijan*. Cham: Springer Nature.

Boucek C. (2004) The Impact of Israeli Foreign Policy in Central Asia: The Case of Uzbekistan. *Central Asia and The Caucasus* 5 (4): 70–81.

Bruns A., Hurcombe E., Harrington S. (2022) Covering Conspiracy: Approaches to Reporting the COVID/5G Conspiracy Theory. *Digital Journalism* 10 (6): 930–951. DOI: 10.1080/21670811.2021.1968921

Chen J., Yang X., Wang M., Su M. (2023) Evolution of China's interaction with Middle Eastern countries under the Belt and Road Initiative. *Plos One* 18 (11).

Cohen J., Aiken L. S., Cohen P., West S. G. (2015) *Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.

Cumming G. (2014) The New Statistics: Why and How. *Psychological Science* 25 (1): 7–29. DOI: 10.1177/0956797613504966

Çelik S. (2019 a) Dünyadaki Çatışmaların Sosyal Ağ Analizi Yöntemiyle İncelenmesi [Examining Global Conflicts Using Social Network Analysis]. Öneri Dergisi 14 (52): 236–254. (In Turkish)

Çelik S. (2019 b) GDELT Kullanarak Toplumsal Huzursuzlukların Tahmin Edilmesi: Tunus Örneği [Predicting Social Unrest Using GDELT: The Case of Tunisia]. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Meslek Yüksekokulu Dergisi* 22 (2): 589–600. (In Turkish)

Çelik S., Oğuzlar A. (2018) Türkiye Ve Bir Grup Ülke İçin Çatışma Verilerinin Kuvvet Yasasına Uygunluğu [Compliance of Conflict Data with Power Law for Turkey and a Group of Countries]. *International Journal of Social Inquiry* 11 (2): 61–80. (In Turkish)

Demir C. (2022) The Organization of Turkic States: Implications for the Regional Balance of Power. *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*: 39–71. DOI: 10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.1104776.

Der Derian J. (2009) *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.

Feiler G., Lim K. (2014) Front Matter (Israel and Kazakhstan). *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*. Pp. 1–4.

Ferreira L. N., Hong I., Rutherford A., Cebrian M. (2021) The small-world network of global protests. *Scientific Reports* 11 (1): 19215. DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-98628-y

Goren N., Lindenstrauss G. (2024) Israel and Turkey. In *Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations*. London: Routledge.

Hamoud T. (2024) Understanding October 7 through Hamas's Adaptability and Leadership Structure. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 53 (2): 88–94.

Hansen L. (2006) *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London: Routledge.

Kalhousov I. (2019) *Our Jews, Our Israel! Origins of the Foreign Policy of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary towards Israel*: PhD thesis. London School of Economics and Political Science.

Koutidis G., Loumponias K., Tsikrika T., Vrochidis S., Kompatsiaris I. (2024) Towards AI-Driven Prediction of Terrorism Risk Based on the Analysis of Localized Web News. *IEEE Access* 12: 167288–167299.

Lakens D. (2022) Sample Size Justification. *Collabra: Psychology* 8 (1): 33267. DOI: 10.1525/collabra.33267

Leetaru K. H. (2015) Mining libraries: Lessons learned from 20 years of massive computing on the world's information. *Information Services and Use* 35 (1–2): 31–50.

Leetaru K., Schrodt P. A. (2013) GDELT: Global Data on Events, Location and Tone, 1979–2012. *International Studies Association Conference*.

Lindén J., Forsström S., Zhang T. (2018) Evaluating Combinations of Classification Algorithms and Paragraph Vectors for News Article Classification. In *Proceedings of the Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems* 15: 489–495. DOI: 10.15439/2018F110.

Omidi A. (2025) Azerbaijan's relations with Israel: Classic alliance, strategic partnership, or marriage of convenience. *Israel Affairs* 31 (1): 9–24.

Oztig L. İ. (2023) Turkish-Israeli relations under AKP rule. *Israel Affairs* 30 (1): 56–69. DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2024.2295611

Sun X., Gao J., Liu B., Wang Z. (2021) Big Data-Based Assessment of Political Risk along the Belt and Road. *Sustainability* 13 (7): Article 7.

Sytnik A., Tsvetkova N., Tsvetkov I. (2022) Tsifrovaya diplomatiya SShA v zerkale bol'shikh dannykh: uroki venesuel'skogo krizisa 2018–2019 godov [U.S. Digital Diplomacy and Big Data: Lessons from the Political Crisis in Venezuela, 2018–2019]. *Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya 4. Istoriya. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* 2: 192–203. DOI: 10.15688/jvolsu4.2022.2.16. (In Russian)

Traub D., Cohen R. A., Kertcher C. (2024) Azerbaijan's dual foreign policy strategy toward Israel: A realist alliance and a neoliberal knowledge-based economy cooperation, 2011–2022. *Cogent Arts and Humanities* 11 (1): 2335763.

Tun-Mendicuti A., Kim J., Mulder C. H. (2024) Understanding opinions towards migrants in transit: An analysis of tweets on Migrant Caravans in the US and Mexico. *ACM Web Science Conference*. Pp. 1–10.

Voukelatou V., Pappalardo L., Miliou I., Gabrielli L., Giannotti F. (2020) Estimating countries' peace index through the lens of the world news as monitored by GDELT. *IEEE 7th International Conference on Data Science and Advanced Analytics (DSAA)*. Pp. 216–225.

Wei Z., Chen X., Tang G., Xie Y. (2025) South China Sea issue and Southeast Asian countries' perception of China's image: An empirical study based on GDELT big data. *PLoS One* 20 (5).

Wycoff N., Singh L. O., Arab A., Donato K. M., Marahrens H. (2024) The digital trail of Ukraine's 2022 refugee exodus. *Journal of Computational Social Science* 7 (2): 2147–2193. DOI: 10.1007/s42001-024-00304-4

Поступила в редакцию
15.09.2025